

DECEMBER 2. 1766.

A N S W E R S

F O R

JOHN CAMPBELL in *Cattleton*;

T O T H E

PETITION of *Andrew Crawford* Drover
in *Gairloch-head*.

THE respondent is a considerable dealer in cattle, and has generally a pretty good stock of his own breeding. Such as are of his own stock, he is invariably in use to mark with a *Heart* and an *O*, upon the far, or right horn; and when so marked, is in use to sell them in droves at the several publick markets in this kingdom, particularly such as fall under the description of stots, which are generally sold in large numbers and not singly. In the course of this trade, the respondent, at *Michaelmas* 1761, sent a drove of five score of stots to the *Falkirk market*, under the care of three or four persons, three of whom have been examined in this cause.

Sometime after the stots had been brought to the market, one of them strayed from the rest, and went into an adjoining drove belonging to the petitioner; and tho' a
search

search was made for it through the rest of the market, the stot could not be found, having been, probably, carried off, before the search, by the petitioner, who, as appears from the proof, is a gentleman very well disposed to give a hospitable reception to strayed cattle, *vide William Ewing*, page 11. E, F, G. The respondent was therefore obliged to dispose of ninety nine of his said stots, to *William and John Ewings*, likewise dealers in cattle, under this proviso, that the remaining stot, when found, should be delivered to them, and that he should be obliged to receive it at the same price with the rest.

In *November 1763*, the respondent learned that his stot had been sold by the petitioner to *Thomas Philips* flesher in *Dumbarton*, and that it was grazing with other cattle which had been likewise sold by the petitioner to Mr. *Philips*, in the parks of *Levenside*.

Upon the 7th of that month, the respondent went to said parks, and after viewing the cattle therein, singled out a brown coloured stot, which he challenged as his property, and as having strayed from him at *Falkirk* market, as above set forth; and, in confirmation of said challenge, having found his mark upon the far horn of said stot, he, in presence of witnesses, applied his burning iron to said mark, which all of them observed, and have now deposed, exactly fitted it.

Upon this discovery, and a clear conviction of the identity of the stot, which being of his own stock, he could the better judge of, the respondent applied to the petitioner for restitution of it. A submission was proposed, and the respondent, who was very desirous to avoid a law suit upon so small a subject, agreed to it.

Oct. 14.
1764. In this shape the matter lay over till the said submission expired, and one of the respondent's most material witnesses died; and it was probably owing to this circumstance, that

that the petitioner did not incline to renew it, tho' the arbiters were men of undoubted character and integrity.

The respondent being unable to obtain redress in an amicable way, was obliged to bring an action before the sheriff of *Dumbarton*, setting forth the above facts, and concluding, that the petitioner (therein called the defender) should be found liable to him, either to deliver said stot, or to pay the value thereof, being seven pounds, with five pounds *sterling* as the expence of plea, and such further sums as should be incurred by said defender's litigiousness. Ap.
176.

In this suit the petitioner rested his defences upon the following facts, which are indeed fairly recited in the petition: That the stots sold to *Thomas Philips*, came from the *Highlands*, and *were picked out of a very large drove*, collected from different corners; so that it need not be any surprise tho' *Cattleton's* (the respondent's) mark, should appear on some of them, as that gentleman dealt at a very extensive rate, and his cattle, after sales, being scattered up and down through second and third hands, to numbers of people, it was impossible to notice the different marks when collecting a drove to go to market; at least, (it was added) the defender *had of late, and still has cattle of different kinds with this pursuer's mark*; so that the question with respect to the present stot, might, after such elapse of time, occasion as relevant a process in other corners as in this.

The defender then proceeds to some argument upon these facts, in his own favours, unnecessary here to be noticed: It is however proper to point out the view with which these facts seem to have been advanced. There was no denying that the brown stot had the respondent's mark upon it, and that it was the only one, of a great quantity sold to *Philips*, that had this mark; it was therefore necessary somehow to account for this single stot making his appearance so suspiciously in that drove: And the defender, to take off the weight of that just suspicion, thought proper to aver
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the fact, that this drove sold to *Philips*, had been picked out of a larger one, collected from all the different corners in the *Highlands*; as it was only in the way of *picking out* that this single spot, evidently the property of a large dealer in cattle, could be supposed to have come into the defender's hands. The defender did not think proper, however, to prove this fact, that would have been attended with more difficulty. And your Lordships will further observe, that in another insinuation, the impossibility of noticing different marks, and the confusion attending their passing through different hands, it is altogether an affected tale to disguise the real truth; for it is now established in proof, that dealers in cattle are very exact in putting on their own marks, or effacing those of others. And as to the third allegation, that the defender had several cattle with the pursuer's mark, evidently intended to account for this single spot's having it: The defender has found it necessary to leave this also destitute of proof.

It would indeed appear from the procedure before the sheriff, that in the course of that process he trusted more to the effects of obstinate litigation, and the difficulty of detecting him, than to the truth of his averments.

For the court will be informed, that he carried the matter so far, as to insist for the pursuer's oath of calumny; upon which the respondent swore, that he had just and good reason and cause to insist in said process.

June 5.
1766.
Extract,
p. 5.

In a question of this kind, where the proof was evidently difficult, relating to the identity of an animal at the distance of some years, and where the respondent was the person who could best know that fact; this was truly a sort of reference as to his knowledge of it; and at a time when oaths of calumny are so unusual in practice, it is hoped this oath of a man of character, tho' a party, will have its due weight in the scale of evidence.

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The respondent must further take notice with regard to this process before the sheriff, that the defender insisted upon the most obstinate and trivial objections against the witnesses; some of them had been brought from *Argyle* shire, by letters of supplement, and by that circumstance were not known to the respondent's procurator. This produced an objection, that the defender had not been served with a list, and procured the delay of the examination for a day.

Against *William Ewing* he gave in an objection, contained in page 8th of the extract, which it is difficult to make sense of, and of which he has not brought the least proof: But at that time he carried it so far, as to appeal to the sheriff-depute for a decision; and against all the rest, he protested for action of reprobator, though he had nothing particular to say to them.

It is only proper further to observe, that the respondent required said defender should be ordained to confess or deny the following facts; " Whether or not he was at the "*Michaelmas* market at *Falkirk* in the year 1761, and had " there a drove of black cattle, or stots, standing nigh a " drove belonging to the pursuer? Whether or not he " knows the pursuer's ordinary mark? and, in the *last* " place, from whom he bought the drove of cattle he the " defender then had, and if he knows any thing with re- " spect to the strayed stot mentioned in the present pro- " secution?"

The sheriff superseded the defender's declaration, till the end of the respondent's proof; and when said defender comes to declare, tho' he is expressly required to condescend from whom he bought the drove of cattle he had at *Falkirk*, he is altogether silent upon that head; and as to the stot in question, is utterly at a loss for an author to it: His declaration is in these words; " Declares, That he was " at the *Michaelmas* market in the year 1761: That he had

“ at that market a drove of stots, which he sold to two
 “ *Englishmen* of the name of *Ladlie* and *Park*, as he thinks.
 “ Declares, That *Duncan Macgregor* at the head of *Glen-*
 “ *froon*, had the care of his cattle at this market : Declares,
 “ That *he does not remember from whom he purchased the stot*
 “ *in dispute.*”

The respondent has been more minute, with regard to the defender's conduct in this process, than was perhaps necessary ; but he apprehends, that if any obscurity should appear in the evidence, it ought to have some weight, that the defender did all in his power to prevent any being brought at all ; and if he averred facts which he alone could clear up, and has now left them destitute of proof, a natural presumption must arise, that either these facts were false, and of course advanced to support a falsehood, or, if enquired into, would have turned out against him : And in the same point of view, it is proper further to inform the court, as it is owned in answers to the bill of advocacy, that *Thomas Philips*, to whom the petitioner had sold this stot, was so conscious that the respondent's plea was just, that he brought an action against the petitioner, for repetition of the price of the stot in question ; in which process the sheriff gave judgment, finding the petitioner liable in restitution, in case of said stot's being evicted. This is demonstration of *Philip's* idea of the matter, and at same time gives no very favourable impression of the defender.

But the respondent apprehends, that he has no occasion to resort to these extraneous arguments ; he has brought as clear and convincing a proof as the nature of the thing is capable of ; and the very defects of it, if there are any, plainly demonstrate the candor and veracity with which it has been conducted. He has clearly proved, that a stot at *Falkirk* market strayed from his drove, and it is evident from all the depositions, that this happened after the stots
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came to the market ; so that the petitioner's alledgeance of its being lost upon the road, will not avail him. *Archibald Campbell*, one of those who attended the drove to said market, depones, page 12th, D. " That at the market, there strayed from the pursuer's stots a stot ; but of what mark or colour, the deponent cannot say. *Dougal Campbell*, p. 12. G. depones, " That at the *Michaelmas* market 1761, held at *Falkirk*, this deponent was employed to assist in driving fivescore of stots to the said market, belonging to the pursuer, which he did : That one of the said stots was amissing, or lost at the said market, but of what colour the deponent cannot say ; and that the mark usually used by the pursuer on his cattle, is a heart and an O upon the far horn ; but cannot say whether these fivescore of stots had the same mark or not, tho' they ought to have had it, as the pursuer puts his mark upon the far, or right horn of the cattle belonging to him. Knows that the pursuer sold his cattle to one *William Ewing* and his brother, near the water of *Leven*. That one of the number, before the sale to Messrs. *Ewings*, was amissing. Depones, That the stot was immediately delivered to Messrs. *Ewings* after the sale ; but, upon recollection, is not positive whether it was upon the day of the sale or not."

It is true, none of these witnesses presume to say, that the individual stot which strayed had this mark, but how could they, unless they had looked at the far horn of every stot in the drove ? they were very well able to ascertain whether a stot had strayed upon the road, or at the market, but it was impossible for them to do the other : what they depose to, however, sufficiently clears up the matter, as both of them fix the pursuer's mark, and very properly add, that these stots ought to have had it, which is sufficiently cleared by what *William Ewing* depones, " That all the cattle the deponent received from the pursuer, as his own stock, had
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p. 9. A. B.

" the said mark." And *John Robertson*, who herded these very cattle, fixes this mark upon them beyond the possibility of doubt, in these words: " That he has been for *some time well* acquainted with the pursuer's mark, which he used to put on his cattle, as he the deponent herded five score of them, about four or five years ago in the parks of *Auchinreoch*. That the said mark put upon the pursuer's cattle is a heart and O."

p. 9. B.

The respondents challenging the stot in question as his, as well as the exactness with which his stamp fitted the impression it formerly made, is proved beyond the possibility of cavil; and the pursuer himself, when called on by the defender, has given evidence in his oath of calumny, that he believed said stot to be his; for such is the import of his oath: And besides all this, *John Robertson* the respondent's herd, the only other person in life, who could have a very intimate knowledge of this drove, depones, " That he *knows* the brown stot, which has been in question formerly before this court, and is now in the hands of *John Rough* tenant in *Garshake*." A herd who tends cattle for a considerable time, and who has no other ideas but what relates to them, may know one of a stock which he has tended, and the witness has said so; so that it is difficult to conceive, what more direct evidence there could have been brought of this fact.

L. 14. § 1.
ff. de peric
et commod.
rei vend.

The very existence of the mark upon this animal, ought to be sufficient to ascertain the property when joined to the practice of dealers, as proved in this case, that they are in use, upon a purchase, to put on their own mark, either upon the old one, when effaced, or by adding it thereto. Most interpreters, in questions of property, have received the maxim, "*cujus et signum ejus est et signatum*;" and very properly found their doctrine upon the texts in the *Roman* law: But there is a great deal more in this case, the actual loss is proved to conviction; which intirely destroys the general exception,

ception, that the subject marked might have been disposed of by the owner ; which, at best, your Lordships will observe, is but a *possibility*, opposed to a contrary proof: And, in the present case, it is rendered highly improbable, if not clearly demonstrated to be false, by the petitioner's own conduct ; for, if he purchased this stot, what hinders him to prove it ? Why has he not established, as averred in his defences, that this single and suspicious stot, was one of those *picked* out of a large herd ? Such fact, if true, could have been easily proved. Nay, why does it want his mark ? He owns he is a dealer in cattle, ought he not to comply with the rules of the trade ? And, if he had fairly purchased this stot, what was the necessity of his advancing, that he had bought many others of the pursuer's cattle, which he has likewise failed to prove ?

In short, the whole circumstances of the case demonstrate, that this stot had strayed into his drove at *Falkirk* market ; and he has not so much as attempted to prove the exception which he made to this, that he had sold the whole cattle he had at the market to two *Englishmen*, whose names, notwithstanding that great purchase, he can scarce recollect.

The petitioner is indeed pleased to say, that his mark not being upon it, is a proof that he had come lawfully by said stot ; because, if he had come unlawfully by it, he would have compleated this unlawful act by putting on his mark. But will it be maintained, that every person who commits a fraud, is cautious enough to do every thing to prevent a discovery ? Want of precaution is luckily often the companion of guilt ; and, in this particular case perhaps, it would be safer to leave the stot without a mark, as the assistance of his servants, if used, might have led to a discovery. But as, indeed, the putting on his mark would not have been conclusive of his having come lawfully by this stot, far less ought the want of it be sustained as an argument of property,

perty. The strong and striking fact against him is, that after the property of this stot has been so clearly proved to be in the respondent, he has not been able to account how he came by this single stot, which is proved to be the only one so marked in a whole drove: Thus *William Erwing* " Depones, P. II. C, D, E. " Knows, as he was told by *Thomas Philips*, that he had " purchased a quantity of stots from the defender, whereof " the stot before mentioned made one; and which stots " came to be grazed in the parks of *Auchinreoch*: And the " deponent did not observe any of the rest of the stots, except the one above mentioned, have the mark above described; and had occasion to see the same very often."

What follows in this deposition, contains an anecdote concerning the defender, not unworthy of notice; as it shews he has been in use to receive strayed cattle. And, " Upon interrogatory of the defender, depones, That he " knows, that about three years ago, there were three stots " strayed from the deponent and his brother, which, after " search, was found about the *Gairlochhead*; but whether " they were their property, or some of those taken in belonging to other people for wintering, or of what colour " they were, the deponent does not know; and which three " stots were brought back to the parks of *Auchinreoch*, as the " deponent was told by his brother."

And it is remarkable, that the defender seems to have been so conscious of this coming out against him, that he strove, *totis viribus*, to suppress this evidence, by objecting to the witness, that he had formerly got a strayed stot from him, which might be the stot in question; thereby meaning to infer a sort of interest in the cause; a fact which he has not pretended to prove, though he protested for action of reprobator.

As the respondent therefore, makes no doubt, that, upon the whole circumstance of the case, your Lordships will be convinced, that the stot in question is his property, and that
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this was known to the defender, he plainly falls within the predicament of one *qui dolo possidere desuit*; and, in this view, the action is as unquestionably competent against him. It is, therefore, almost unnecessary to mention, that this objection was not stated before the sheriff, which, therefore, if competent, must be considered as omitted. Nor is it necessary to enter into the subtlety of the *Roman* law, the writers on which consider, *liti se offerentes*, as possessors in this action; particularly when they do not name their author, which is the case. In this case, it was a matter of indifference to the respondent, whether *Philpis* or he had been sued; as the sheriff had, in a question betwixt them, found, that if the spot was evicted, the petitioner should be obliged to restore the price. And it surely would not have been so just to have given him additional trouble, as *Philips* had done what every honest man ought to do, and can with ease do, *viz.* had condescended upon his author.

Heineccius,
lib. 6. ad
Pand. tit. 1.
§. 87.

The respondent apprehends, that the petitioner's other argument in law, is equally ill-founded; for the act 1663, concerning advocations, as well as the 20th of *George II.* applies only to suits for sums of money; whereas here, the pursuit was concerning a *corpus*: And, even in the other view, the pursuer had suffered much more damage by the defender's delays and litigiousity, than would make up the legal sum. But besides, the Lord Ordinary has not, in any shape, transgressed these statutes; for he has not advocated the cause, but remitted the same to the sheriff; and it is clear, that a reduction was not necessary to obtain redress, as the defender had not extracted his decret.

Upon the whole, the respondent makes no doubt, but your Lordships will adhere to the Lord Ordinary's interlocutor.

In respect whereof, &c.

ILAY CAMPBELL.

The first of these is the fact that the
University of Chicago is a private institution
and is not subject to the same regulations
as public institutions. This is a fact which
must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

The second fact is that the University
of Chicago is a research institution and
is not primarily concerned with the
teaching of students. This is a fact which
must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

The third fact is that the University
of Chicago is a large institution and
is not a small college. This is a fact
which must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

The fourth fact is that the University
of Chicago is a leading institution in
the field of research. This is a fact
which must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

The fifth fact is that the University
of Chicago is a leading institution in
the field of education. This is a fact
which must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

The sixth fact is that the University
of Chicago is a leading institution in
the field of public service. This is a fact
which must be taken into account in any
discussion of the University's policies.

